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Abstract 
We examine the associations between management direct communication to employees, 
unionization, foreign direct investment (FDI) and company performance in Mauritius, 
Africa’s most successful economy, using a survey conducted in late 2011.  Mauritian labor 
unions, in common with their continental counterparts, are strongest in the public sector.  
They have been characterized as weak and lacking in influence on management.  Yet we find 
a strong association between unionization and management communication in the private 
sector.  We also find a positive association between direct communication and company 
performance which we argue is likely to be an indirect consequence of unionization.  FDI 
shows no particular effects.  
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MANAGEMENT COMMUNICATION, UNIONIZATION, FDI AND COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
We examine the associations between management direct communication to employees, 
unionization and company performance, in the context of Mauritius, the only case of African 
developmental success not based on natural resources.  Mauritius is widely canvassed as an 
African success story, a unique regional example of successful development essentially 
achieved through its human resources, without any element of natural resource endowments 
(Lange, 2003; Sandbrook, 2005; Lincoln, 2006; Sandbrook et al., 2007; Darga, 2011; Van 
Demorteele and Bird, 2010).  It has been referred to as a national example that is widely 
admired on the African continent (Sandbrook et al., 2007; Darga, 2011).  In the forty years 
since independence, successive essentially social-democratic governments have successfully 
diversified the economy from its previous dependence on sugar, presiding over the 
development of light manufacturing, textiles, tourism and finance.  Considerable industrial 
diversification is present; the country is an open economy with high levels of FDI, which also 
has a significant body of domestic companies (Van Demorteele and Bird, 2010).  The country 
has no significant regional variations on any relevant dimensions, unlike many African 
countries (Almond, 2011).   
Strategic HRM, as in much of Africa, has long been and remains only weakly 
developed on the island (Ramgutty-Wong, 2004; Kamoche et al, 2004; Goolaup and 
Ramasawmy, 2011).  Research on a small sample of ten local managers nevertheless reports a 
strong emphasis by these practitioners on the importance of good internal communications 
(Boojihawon and Hanuman-Oogarah, 2010).  Labor unions are based at the enterprise level 
but have benefitted from considerable tripartite involvement (Fashoyin, 2010).  In common 
3 
 
with many other labor union movements world-wide, they have suffered from a gradual 
decline in membership in the last thirty years.  Mauritian unions have been one of a range of 
institutions that have been argued to have a significant influence on the country’s healthy and 
stable civil society (Srebrnik, 2000).  By contrast, Laville (2000) argues that such institutions 
have little impact on the disadvantage experienced by the substantial Creole minority.  The 
latter argument is consistent with another: that they exert most influence in the public sector 
where the Indian ethnic grouping is most in evidence, and that their bargaining has been 
focused on improving this group’s pay and conditions (McCourt and Ramgutty-Wong, 2003; 
Ramgutty-Wong, 2004). 
Joseph Stiglitz, the World Bank’s ex-Chief Economist, has argued that ‘Labor unions 
… are key to democratic economic development’ (Stiglitz, 2000: 22) and in doing so, he 
challenged the neo-liberal consensus that informed the successive forms of ‘structural 
adjustment’ policies of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) towards African 
countries.  These tended, partly as a conscious priority, to de-unionize their economies since 
unions were held, following classical economic theory, to distort labor markets (Wood and 
Brewster, 2007).  Stiglitz stressed the broad societal role played by unions in developing co-
operative, mutual institutions that built civil society.  To some extent, arguments confined to 
this level may be an inevitable result of the fact that outside of the exceptional South African 
case, minimal evidence has been available on unionization and its effects at enterprise level 
in Africa.  This is especially the case in the private sector, since African labor unionism has 
become a largely public sector phenomenon (Wood and Brewster, 2007).  We therefore seek 
to examine how far unions are associated with an important management practice in private 
firms, and extend our inquiry to include company performance.   
The article is structured as follows.  First, we discuss the association between 
unionization and direct communication, advancing three tentative propositions for empirical 
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testing.  We then introduce our data and methods, followed by our estimation and findings 
before concluding and revisiting our propositions. 
 
2.  DIRECT COMMUNICATION AND UNIONIZATION 
Direct communication has long been seen as a key element of an organizational strategy of 
employee involvement, ‘an umbrella term covering a wide range of voluntary employer-led 
initiatives designed to encourage more active employee participation in (organizational) 
affairs’ (Caldwell, 1993: 136). Direct communication with employees on company financial 
performance and strategy is also one of the seven dimensions of High Involvement 
Management that Pfeffer (1998) identifies as generating significant economic returns.  He 
suggests that it does so by promoting employee affective commitment and reducing 
intentions to quit.  It seems likely to constitute part of a ‘partial gift exchange’ between 
employer and employee in those companies where employees perceive it to be strong in 
relation to other companies seen as realistic comparators (Akerlof, 1982).    
Unionization is associated with strong direct communication in European companies 
(Croucher et al., 2006; Peccei et al., 2005; Tanova and Nadiri, 2010).  It has also been shown 
to be one of a bundle of practices associated with relatively strong performance in European 
companies (Rizov and Croucher, 2009).  Mauritian unions have been characterized as neither  
strong nor weak in the African context, but in common with many other labor unions in 
Africa, they have been portrayed as especially weak in the private sector (McCourt and 
Ramgutty-Wong, 2003; Ramgutty-Wong, 2004).  They have been held to be focused on pay 
and conditions issues and judged not to be influential on management behavior (Ramgutty-
Wong, 2004).  These judgements are consistent with those made by experts on Africa more 
widely.  These emphasize the predominance of ‘leader-follower’ relations and suggest that 
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more high-involvement production paradigms are normally found only among the foreign 
companies operating in South Africa (Wood and Brewster, 2007; Wood and Frynas, 2006).  
Wood and Frynas (2006) identify weak unionization as one of the institutional foundations 
that they argue are linked to the failure of African ‘segmented business systems’ to deliver 
successful development.    
From a theoretical viewpoint, two factors potentially raise incentives for Mauritian 
unions to focus on demanding company information as a route to raising their utility to 
employees and improving their levels of influence on managements.  First, local unions are 
largely enterprise-based, a structure likely to diminish their capacity to bargain by reference 
to external benchmarks (Marsden, 1999) and they are therefore likely to channel their 
activities more internally to the company than externally towards the political sphere.  
Second, local managements are increasingly pursuing union substitution policies, pushing 
unions to find ways of improving their appeal to both workers and managements (Ramgutty-
Wong, 2009).  Addressing information asymmetry between management and workers may 
therefore appear a viable non-confrontational strategy for demonstrating their utility that does 
not rely on (weak) mobilizing capacity.  However, unions may be too lacking in strategic 
orientation or simply too weak to pursue such a policy.  Moreover, it may be that as Croucher 
et al. (2006) suggest, the effect of unionization on management communication is not the 
product of union strategy.  These researchers suggest that the mechanism is more indirect in 
that union members’ attitudes to management communications are relatively skeptical and 
therefore managers intensify their communications efforts in seeking to convince them.   
Therefore, although the current state of knowledge is too weak to permit the 
formulation of formal hypotheses, the literature suggests three tentative propositions.  First, 
even though unionization in Mauritius appears weak and fragmented it might be positively 
associated with management communications since it addresses the information asymmetry 
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between management and workers.  Second, given union fragmentation they may be equally 
likely to be influential on communications in both the public and the private sector since they 
may be relatively unconstrained by centralized bureaucratic regulation.  Further, if the 
information asymmetry is more pronounced in the private sector union influence could be 
stronger there.  Finally, abstracting from neo-classical economic theory and the philosophy 
underlying IFI policies, unionization could be associated with strong company performance 
via its expected effect on management communication, and ultimately improved employee 
motivation.  In all three cases, as we have indicated above, some grounds exist for 
entertaining the reverse propositions.    
 
3.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data 
Our data are derived from the 2011 Mauritius HR survey, specially designed to cover a wide 
range of HR policies and practices at organizational level.  The respondents are the highest-
ranking corporate officers in charge of HRM.  The survey instrument was developed using an 
iterative process between the authors and local experts.  
The instrument consisted of 57 questions - many with multiple options - ranging 
across the full range of HR practices and including detailed information on the company.  
The main headings are: HRM activity in the organization; staffing practices; employee 
development; compensation and benefits; employee relations and communication; knowledge 
transfer; organizational details.  The survey was administered by post in November 2011.  
350 organizations in both the public and private sectors were surveyed, using a sampling 
frame derived from a Human Resources Development Commission (HRDC) data base of 
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companies employing more than ten people and specifically designed by the HRDC to be 
representative of employment by industry.   
The considerable difficulties of conducting survey research in the local context have 
been stressed (Ramgutty-Wong, 2004: 55).  120 organizations returned usable questionnaires, 
giving a response rate of 34%.  The survey instrument’s complexity, the number of 
respondent organizations and response rate compare favorably with other Mauritian HRM 
surveys although theoretically, the larger number of questions might have led to a lower 
response (Rea and Parker, 2005).  The number of questions asked is considerably larger than 
in previous surveys (for example, sixty six public and private organizations answering sixteen 
questions including multiple options and with a response rate of 33% - in Ramgutty-Wong 
and Gokhool (2000); forty six private companies answering an unspecified number of 
questions in Ramgutty-Wong (2004)).  So, too, are the number of organizations responding to 
our questionnaire. 
Public ownership is spread across all major industries and accounts for approximately 
one-third of employment. In our sample there are 48 such organizations and publicly-owned 
bodies are therefore slightly over-represented.  The median number of employees in 
respondent companies is 200.  The smallest employs 12 and the largest has 12,000 
employees.  The sample’s industry composition is as follows: services 50%; transport, 
communications and utilities 23%; manufacturing 16%; construction 7%; agriculture 4%.  
The sample is broadly reflective of the island’s industrial structure, but manufacturing and 
agriculture are marginally under-represented within it when measured against official figures 
of employment in different industries (Mauritius Central Statistics Office, 2011).  
Data were input to an SPSS data entry file created by the authors in conjunction with 
an external company.  The data were entered by one person employed by that company and 
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checked separately by another experienced colleague.  Spot checks on the data entry were 
also carried out by the three researchers involved in conducting the survey.   
 
Variables 
The dependent variable - direct communication (DCOM) and the (main) explanatory variable 
labor union influence (TRUN) - are ordinal categorical scales.  We apply Mokken’s 
nonparametric scaling model (Mokken and Lewis, 1982) to compute our synthetic indices as 
in Gooderham et al. (1999) and Croucher et al. (2006).  The unweighted sum of item scores 
forming each scale must be monotonously related to the latent true scores, as demonstrated 
by Sjitsma et al. (1990).  The primary scaling criterion is Loevinger’s H-coefficient of 
homogeneity.  A set of items constitutes a scale if the aggregate has an H-value exceeding 
0.30; values above 0.50 indicate strong scales.  The scales’ internal consistency is verified by 
Cronbach’s Alpha which increases in line with the intercorrelations between scale items.  
Because intercorrelations among test items are maximized when all items measure the same 
construct, Cronbach's Alpha is taken as indirectly indicating the degree to which a set of 
items measures a single unidimensional latent construct.  Alpha values above 0.70 indicate a 
strong scale.   
The dependent variable, DCOM, is constructed as in Croucher et al. (2006) as a 
composite index capturing employer communication to employees, that is, whether 
organizations brief clerical and manual employees on issues of business strategy, financial 
performance and work organization.  Each of the six questions is coded as a binary variable 
(yes = 1 and no = 0).  We extend the index by adding responses to three more questions 
indicating employees’ direct communication to employers such as through regular workforce 
meetings, team briefings and electronic communication.  Each of the three additional 
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questions is also coded as a binary variable (yes = 1 and no = 0).  Thus a ten-point scale is 
created, with one to nine indicating the briefing of both clerical and manual employees on all 
three issues and the existence of employee-employer communication; zero indicates no 
briefing of either category on any of the issues and no communication in any form.  The 
reliability of our DCOM index as measured by Cronbach’s Alpha is satisfactory (0.69) while 
Loevinger’s H-coefficient is acceptable at 0.51. 
TRUN is a composite index consisting of the responses to three questions designed to 
assess the degree of union presence and influence.  The three questions are: What proportion 
of the total number of employees in your organization are members of a labor union?  (Firms 
were divided into three categories: 0 percent = 0, 1–50 percent = 1, over 50 percent = 2.)  Do 
labor unions have any influence on your organization?  (Yes = 1, no = 0.)  Do you recognize 
labor unions for the purpose of collective bargaining?  (Yes = 1, no = 0.)  The sum of the 
responses to the above questions is used to form an index that ranges from 0 (no union 
presence/influence) to 4 (high degree of union presence/influence).  The index has high 
reliability as measured by Cronbach’s Alpha (0.82), and a very high Loevinger’s H-
coefficient of 0.81. 
Following the conceptual frameworks of Croucher et al. (2006) and Rizov and 
Croucher (2009), we control in our regression analysis for company and industry 
characteristics that may affect direct communication: company size (SIZE), company age 
(AGE) and a set of dummy variables controlling for type of industry – manufacturing 
(MANU) and other industries (OTHR) with services as the reference category.  SIZE is a 
dichotomous variable with 1 indicating companies larger than the median number of 
company employees and 0 otherwise.  AGE is a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating 
companies older than the median company age and 0 otherwise.   
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In extended specifications we also introduce the impact of company ownership on 
direct communication.  We distinguish ownership in two dimensions, foreign (FOWN) vs. 
domestic and private (POWN) vs. public companies.  Both variables are dichotomous, with 1 
indicating foreign (private) ownership and 0 otherwise.  The FOWN variable captures the 
impact of FDI on direct communication.   
Finally, in auxiliary regressions we verify the link between performance, direct 
communication, and labor union presence/ influence.  Therefore, we create a measure of 
relative performance (PERF) following Rizov and Croucher (2009) which we use as a 
dependent variable in the auxiliary (second stage) regressions.  PERF is measured as a 
composite index capturing the effects of five performance dimensions: service quality, level 
of productivity, profitability, rate of innovation, and stock market performance.  Each 
component dimension is an ordinal categorical variable measuring the relative position of the 
firm in comparison to the rest of the industry (Top 10% - 3, upper half – 2, and lower half – 
1).  The sum of the responses for the above five dimensions is used to form an index that 
ranges from 1 to 15.  The index has high reliability as measured by Cronbach’s Alpha (0.86), 
and a reasonably high Loevinger’s H-coefficient of 0.66. 
Summary statistics and short definitions of all regression variables are reported in 
Table 1.  Correlation matrices for selected (first-stage) regression variables are presented in 
the Appendix, Table A1.  The low correlations between regression variables indicate no 
endogeneity problems.   
TABLE 1:  SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable code Definition Mean  
(s.d.) 
DCOM Direct communications in the firm indicator ranging 
between 0 and 9 
5.308  
(2.045) 
SIZE Firm size measured as a dichotomous variable with 1 
denoting firms above the median size and 0 otherwise 
0.567  
(0.498) 
AGE Firm age measured as a dichotomous variable with 1 0.683  
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denoting firms above the median age and 0 otherwise (0.467) 
MANU Dichotomous variable with 1 denoting firms in the 
manufacturing sector 
0.158  
(0.366) 
OTHR Dichotomous variable with 1 denoting firms in the 
construction, agriculture and mixed industries 
0.333  
(0.473) 
TRUN Presence and influence of labor unions indicator ranging 
between 0 and 4 
1.842  
(1.598) 
FOWN Dichotomous variable with 1 denoting firms under foreign 
ownership and 0 – domestic ownership 
0.267  
(0.444) 
POWN Dichotomous variable with 1 denoting firms under private 
ownership and 0 – public ownership 
0.600  
(0.492) 
PERF Composite performance of the firm indicator ranging 
between 1 and 15 
8.906 
(3.578) 
Note: The number of observations in the total estimated sample is 120.  
 
4.  ESTIMATION AND FINDINGS 
We estimate the relationship between direct communication and the explanatory variables by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Ordered Logit (OL).  Because the dependent variable is 
categorical in nature, it is in principle appropriate to use the OL estimator.  However, given 
that the categorization of the dependent variable, DCOM is quite fine and exhibits normal 
distribution, OLS may also be used.  The results from the two methods are very similar and 
we report and discuss the OLS results, which are easier to interpret.  The OL results are 
available from the authors on request.   
TABLE 2:  FULL SAMPLE: FACTORS AFFECTING DIRECT COMMUNICATION 
Variables Models 
(1) (2) (3) 
SIZE -0.032 
-0.300  
(0.400) 
-0.030 
-0.281  
(0.402) 
0.022 
-0.202  
(0.404) 
AGE -0.050 
-0.392  
(0.426) 
-0.066 
-0.516  
(0.430) 
-0.076 
-0.590  
(0.432) 
MANU -0.004 
-0.135  
(0.544) 
-0.007 
-0.227  
(0.538) 
-0.013 
-0.435  
(0.539) 
OTHR -0.027 
-0.431  
(0.421) 
-0.023 
-0.368  
(0.417) 
-0.022 
-0.346  
(0.417) 
TRUN - +0.088 +0.127 
12 
 
+0.254 ** 
(0.125) 
+0.357 ** 
(0.137) 
FOWN - - +0.021 
+0.421  
(0.433) 
POWN - - +0.088 
+0.779 * 
(0.430) 
No of Obs. 120 120 120 
Adj. R
2 
0.019 0.112 0.137 
Notes: For each regression variable we report first the elasticity, then the estimated 
coefficient and the standard error (in parentheses). The level of significance of estimated 
coefficients is indicated as follows: 1 percent ***, 5 percent **, 10 percent *. 
 
First, we estimate the full sample and report the results in Table 2.  To test for 
possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables we expand the specification stepwise as in 
Croucher et al. (2006) and Rizov and Croucher (2009).  This approach demonstrates no 
endogeneity problems as the coefficients in all specifications remain stable.   
We begin with a base specification where the explanatory variables are the main 
company characteristics, SIZE and AGE and the industry controls, MANU and OTHR and 
report the results in column (1).  These control variables do not appear significantly to 
explain direct communication; this could be because there is no significant variation in 
communication practices across these company types and may be due to the limited size of 
our sample.  Next, we extend the specification with labor union presence and influence, 
TRUN and report the results in column (2).  The effect of TRUN is positive and significant 
(at the 5 percent level) while the effects of all control variables from the previous 
specification remain unchanged.  Finally, we introduce the controls for foreign and private 
ownership (column 3).  The coefficient of FOWN is not statistically significant while the 
coefficient of POWN is significant only at the 10 percent level.  The coefficients of all 
variables from previous specifications remain stable.   
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TABLE 3:  OWNERSHIP SUB-SAMPLES: FACTORS AFFECTING DIRECT 
COMMUNICATION 
Variables Models 
      Public/Private     Domestic/Foreign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SIZE -0.056 
-0.503  
(0.613) 
-0.069 
-0.348  
(0.528) 
-0.012 
-0.105  
(0.499) 
-0.025 
-0.273  
(0.680) 
AGE -0.035 
-0.225  
(0.727) 
-0.084 
-0.837  
(0.524) 
-0.065 
-0.492  
(0.538) 
-0.092 
-0.770  
(0.743) 
MANU -0.006 
-0.245  
(0.931) 
-0.023 
-0.932  
(0.672) 
-0.007 
-0.252  
(0.733) 
-0.009 
-0.217  
(0.788) 
OTHR -0.028 
-0.460  
(0.644) 
-0.001 
-0.339  
(0.519) 
-0.039 
-0.533  
(0.502) 
-0.023 
-0.712  
(0.814) 
TRUN +0.044 
+0.083  
(0.204) 
+0.152 
+0.756 *** 
(0.186) 
+0.096 
+0.264 * 
(0.150) 
+0.088 
+0.289  
(0.237) 
No of Obs. 48 72 88 32 
Adj. R
2 
0.048 0.157 0.112 0.058 
Notes: For each regression the variables reported are first, the elasticity, then the estimated 
coefficient and the standard error (in parentheses). The level of significance of estimated 
coefficients is indicated as follows: 1 percent ***, 5 percent **, 10 percent *. 
 
Ownership is an important organizational environmental characteristic that is often 
relevant to union presence and influence.  Therefore, we further analyze the relationship 
between direct communication and the explanatory variables in sub-samples by ownership 
type and report our results in Table 3.  In columns (1) and (2) we compare public and private 
ownership.  The main finding is that in private organizations the single most important factor 
positively affecting direct communication is TRUN with the coefficient significant at the1 
percent level.  TRUN is not significant in public organizations.  The finding of union 
importance for communication in private companies is interesting given frequent reference in 
the literature to union weakness in private companies.  The results from the domestic vs. 
foreign ownership sub-samples are reported in columns (3) and (4).  In the domestic sub-
sample a statistically significant relationship (though only at the10 percent level) is evident 
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between direct communication and TRUN.  TRUN is not significant in the foreign sub-
sample. 
TABLE 4  FULL SAMPLE: FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE 
Variables Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DCOM 0.159 
0.267  
(0.177) 
 0.168 
0.281  
(0.180) 
 
DCOMXB  0.792 
1.330 *** 
(0.530) 
 1.057 
1.774 *** 
(0.602) 
TRUN   -0.022 
-0.105  
(0.220) 
-0.036 
-0.176  
(0.238) 
No of Obs. 107 107 107 107 
Adj. R
2 
0.021 0.055 0.023 0.077 
Notes: For each regression variable we report first the elasticity, then the estimated 
coefficient and the standard error (in parentheses). The level of significance of estimated 
coefficients is indicated as follows: 1 percent ***, 5 percent **, 10 percent *. DCOMXB 
denotes the predicted value from the specification in Table 2 (column 3). 
 
To complete the analysis on the link between labor union presence and influence, 
direct communication and, ultimately, performance we directly verify the impact of 
communication on firm performance by regressing (using OLS) the performance index, 
PERF on DCOM and report the results in Table 4 (column 1).  The estimated coefficient is 
not statistically different from zero.  From both the theoretical and econometric points of 
view it is likely that the estimation is affected by reverse causality as performance may affect 
communication leading to DCOM being correlated with the error term.  Therefore, we next 
use the predicted value of DCOM from the estimated specification in Table 2 (column 3) and 
report the results in column 2 of Table 4.  The coefficient of the predicted DCOM is highly 
statistically significant confirming the positive effect of communication on firm performance 
but also suggesting that the effect of direct communication on performance is indeed subject 
to (negative) reverse causality, i.e., high performance negatively affects direct 
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communication.  Further, we verify the direct effect of labor unions on firm performance by 
adding TRUN to each of the two specifications considered in columns 1 and 2 respectively.  
We find that in each specification the direct impact of labor unions on performance is not 
statistically significant (see columns 3 and 4).  We therefore conclude that labor unions 
(positively) impact firm performance only indirectly, and that they do so via the direct 
communication channel.  This tends to suggest that the indirect mechanism operating through 
employee attitudes advanced by Croucher et al. (2006) in the case of European firms may 
also be in operation in the Mauritian context.   
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
We examined the associations between labor union presence and influence, communication, 
FDI and performance.  All three propositions derived from the literature and contextualized 
to the Mauritian environment have been upheld.  We find that the associations are especially 
strong in the private sector, despite the higher union density and relatively stable 
organizational environment obtaining in the public sector.  Precisely how the associations 
arise is unclear and would require case study research to reveal.   
Our analysis presents a rather different picture of Mauritian employee relations than 
those depicted as typical of African companies by Wood and Frynas (2006).  More successful 
(in the sense of better performing) Mauritian companies show no common characteristics in 
terms of size, age nor industrial sector and represent a grouping that merits further 
investigation.  Foreign-owned firms do not show a particular propensity to communicate to 
employees and in this sense, the demonstration effects that may be assumed to constitute a 
positive consequence of FDI are absent.  It may be that certain firm-level linkages exist 
between and indeed beyond the factors we have been able to observe, and case study research 
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would help to establish these.  In addition, comparative research on employee attitudes 
similar to that carried out in Europe on employee responses to communications practices 
(Kessler et al., 2004) is lacking in Africa and is also required to provide a wider comparative 
frame.   
Most significantly, it appears that the consequences of union presence in private 
companies transcend pay and conditions.  The effects are unexpectedly marked, particularly 
when the stress by some authors both on union weakness in the private sector and their 
supposed concentration on narrow bargaining agendas is taken into account (McCourt and 
Ramgutty-Wong, 2003; Ramgutty-Wong, 2004).  This lends more support for the argument 
that unions act as an integrating force in society than for the contrary view since they have 
communication effects and not only in the Hindu-dominated public service (Meisenhelder, 
1997).   
As we suggested at the outset, it may be that local unions’ strong focus on the 
enterprise - a form of representation favored by U.S.-based multinational companies 
(Bognanno et al., 2005), constitutes a strength in stimulating management communication to 
employees by focusing union activities at that level.  Whilst we have suggested that this may 
not be primarily a result of conscious union strategy, the enterprise focus may serve to 
buttress existing employee attitudes.    
The question arises of how far our results may be generalized to other African 
countries.   Mauritius participates in many African regional organizations, and is therefore 
often considered under the ‘African’ rubric.  Yet the island has many structural characteristics 
that make it sui generis: it lacks a strong military, has a long history of tripartism and a 
relatively stable democracy to name just three.  These and other national characteristics mean 
that our findings would require empirical testing in other national environments to establish 
how far they might be generalisable.   
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In any event, unionization is certainly closely associated in Mauritius with a practice 
that is linked to positive economic effects at the enterprise level.  Thus, widespread 
characterizations of this form of employee voice as negative are to this extent inappropriate, 
at least in this national context.   
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1  CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 DCOM SIZE AGE MANU OTHR TRUN FOWN POWN 
DCOM 1.000        
SIZE -0.041 1.000       
AGE -0.099 0.308 1.000      
MANU 0.002 0.057 0.050 1.000     
OTHR -0.098 0.048 0.063 -0.307 1.000    
TRUN 0.146 0.283 0.292 0.129 -0.074 1.000   
FOWN 0.122 -0.043 0.005 0.151 -0.187 -0.035 1.000  
POWN 0.099 -0.028 -0.190 0.075 0.036 -0.423 0.185 1.000 
 
 
